

Chapter 11

I'M FREE THEN I'M MORAL

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Moral act is inevitable for individuals' freedom. Freedom and morality are two main notions of philosophy. From past to present, these two notions have been handled and discussed and redefined by the philosophers.

Aristo philosophically qualifies morality only as a part of politics. However, since morality is not only a part of political theory but also approaches our actions and their normative conclusions, it is considered as a basis which practical philosophy provides to other disciplines. Human action is not only an external activity depending on time and place. In a mental process, this activity is accompanied by individual's thinking, forming a will, intention and ability to make a decision.

Morality can be briefly described as searching for an answer to the question of "What should I do?", which reflects a reason and the following act. The subject of morality consists of, on one hand, individuals' choices, decisions, wills and desires, on the other hand, the acts that come along with these choices, decisions, wills and desires. Of course, we cannot consider all actions as a subject of morality. Therefore, we can limit the subject as the actions which are potentially let or forbidden. In other words, so as to consider an action moral, individual has to break or act according to a moral rule deliberately with that action.

There are initially two elements to pay attention: The first one is "mental action", which emerges from free will as a result of desire, choice and decision of a moral act. The second one is the verb "do", which may be defined as executing any action. Consequently, to rephrase it, we can say that moral action has two elements and these cannot be separated: "mental action" and "action". One cannot be realized without the other. They are like two sides of a medallion.

People first manage, consider and decide their own will: the experience emerging from our actions as a bearer of a subject and some certain adjectives. And at this point, the idea of freedom comes along. It is considered as morality that a person who executes an action again executes a free action with their wish, desire, judgement and free will. That is to say, it is assumed that the person realizes both

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make it a responsible individual. Thus, it is not a spectator who does not have the opportunity to interfere with human life, but it can be defined as a responsible, autonomous entity throughout its life.

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